Abstract: One of the frustrating aspects of the republic debate is that far too much time is spent discussing the method of electing or appointing the president, and far too little time spent considering what that president should do. Any direct election model offers real challenges and indeed contradictions.

REPUBLICANS are now starting to think critically about how a republic could be established. Some would argue that the 1999 model should be retained, with some refinements, and once there is broader political and community support, it can be carried. Others contend that only a directly elected presidential model will carry the day.

Without wanting to advocate any model over another, I have prepared a number of alternative models, which have formed the basis of a discussion paper being considered by the Australian Republican Movement. Those models will include several involving direct election. The paper also includes a slightly refined version of the 1999 model, with a president appointed by two-thirds of parliament, as well as an ultra-minimalist model, with a president appointed by the prime minister.

One of the frustrating aspects of the republic debate is that far too much time is spent discussing the method of electing or appointing the president, and far too little time spent considering what that president should do. If we define the president as being someone who is to be non-political and impartial, then logic suggests the mode of appointment be calculated to deliver someone with those qualities. That is why the 1999 model required the support of government and Opposition to any appointment. It guaranteed bipartisanship.

Any direct election model offers real challenges and indeed contradictions. How do you reconcile a competitive political election process with a non-political office? Direct election supporters have said that the powers of the governor-general, which are considerable, could be altered to prevent an elected president trying to challenge the PM. It is possible to codify and largely eliminate the discretionary powers of the governor-general and render the president an almost entirely ceremonial figure. The drafting exercise is not too difficult, and a good example is found in the 1993 Republic Advisory Committee report. But getting consensus on what the code should say is a tall order indeed.

Even if the president is rendered ceremonial only, an elected president will still have enormous popular moral authority. His "bully pulpit" will be immensely greater than that of the governor-general, who can be hired and fired by the PM. An elected president will therefore combine enormous prestige and authority on the one hand, with no political responsibility on the other. An elected president could lecture the government of the day endlessly on the deficiencies of schools, hospitals and social welfare without having the responsibility of raising taxes to pay for them. This could become particularly difficult if the elected president were a political opponent of the PM.

So is it possible to combine the democratic appeal of electing the president and still get an impartial, non-political person such as William Deane or Zelman Cowen? Some people have suggested that perhaps there should be a filtering process, with an electoral college to determine who would be acceptable candidates. This has been put to me as a means of ensuring Kylie Minogue was not a presidential candidate. But if Kylie can run for parliament, why should she not be able to run for president? And who is to sit on this electoral college? If it is elected, then won't it be just as politicised as parliament? It is one thing to require a large number of nominators in order to discourage frivolous candidates, but how do you reconcile the principle of a popular vote without an open right to nominate?

I am afraid I see little merit in filtering candidates for a presidential election. It seems to me that if we are to have an election for president then, subject to securing the agreed number of nominations, any Australian should be able to stand.

We have to recognise that an elected presidency will mean that an office that has hitherto been almost invariably non-political will become politicised. We also have to recognise that presidential candidates will be supported by political parties, that they may engage in contentious political debate and that they will, even if unintentionally, constitute a source of rival authority to the government of the day.

Of course much will depend on how particular incumbents conduct themselves. It would also be possible to require the elected president to commit, in an inauguration oath, to act in an impartial fashion favouring neither one side of politics nor the other. A little corny perhaps, and certainly unenforceable, but it should encourage the right kind of approach to the office. Whether all this is a good or bad thing, or whether it is a price worth paying to have a republic is a question we will have to consider.

I have no doubt that choosing a president via direct election and a two-thirds vote of parliament are equally democratic processes. Our system, after all, is based on representative government. We trust our elected representatives to make our laws. Our PM is chosen, in effect, by the House of Representatives. The US president is elected, in effect, by the people. Yet both countries are equally democratic.

Would such a system work? Of course it would work. The question is whether it is the best republican alternative and, most important, whether it will be better constitutionally than the status quo. At this time it is not my task, or that of the ARM, to advocate one model over another. But we should all be alert to the fact that each republican model carries with it different consequences, not all of which may be to our liking.

Malcolm Turnbull is a former chairman of the Australian Republican Movement.