THE REPUBLICAN CAMPAIGN IN AUSTRALIA

Paper by Professor John Warhurst
at Australasian Political Studies Association Conference,
University of Tasmania,
Hobart
01 October 2003

Will Australians only get one chance to vote for a republic?

When the then leader of the Australian Republican Movement (ARM), Malcolm Turnbull, reckoned during the campaign that the 1999 referendum might be Australians' one and only chance to vote for an Australian Head of State he was dismissed as a scare monger. Even the monarchists implied that they were only opposed to 'this' republic and that voters should wait for a better one.

Yet by the time of the next federal election five years will have elapsed and progress may appear to have stalled. It shows just how rare chances for constitutional reform are and just how tough it is to achieve a second chance.

Australians probably will get a second chance at some stage, but there are formidable obstacles to surmount before that second referendum is held, much less won. The referendum defeat revealed some of those obstacles.

There was (and still is) a lack of republican consensus about both the best model for a republic and the best way to move forward. The republican 'church' is a very broad one indeed and it includes people who otherwise have very little in common.

There was (and still is) a lack of political bipartisanship and enthusiasm for the republic. The Prime Minister, John Howard, remains opposed and his Liberal Party is still divided. The National Party is still opposed as a party though some individuals, like Larry Anthony, are not. Labor Party policy has been republican for 20 years but its leadership is still tentative and divided about the detail. The Democrats and the Greens remain in favour.

There was (and still is) an apparent lack of political urgency. Many supporters naively believed in 1999 that because a republic was supposedly inevitable there was no urgent need to vote YES because a second chance would come sooner or later. Monarchists and other opponents shrewdly encouraged that idea. The word 'inevitable' should be cast out of the lexicon of all republicans. It is like a kiss of death.

This paper examines the past, present and future of the republican campaign in Australia. Its perspective is influenced by the position of the author as chair of the ARM. Parts of the paper concentrate particularly on the ARM.

A Brief History: where has the issue come from?

Over the course of the twentieth century Australian political institutions were slowly reshaped to reflect the unravelling of the British Empire and the growth of Australian national identity and independence. The story is a familiar one and includes formal legislative change such as the Australia Act in 1986 and informal steps such as the appointment of Australians as Governor General.

One part of this development was popular and elite attraction to the idea of an Australian republic (Warhurst 1999). Popular sentiment grew until by the 1990s republicans became a majority and therefore constitutional change became a serious issue on the political agenda. The Labor Party under Paul Keating appointed a Republic Advisory Committee in 1993 and promised an Australian Republic by 1 January 2001, the centenary of federation. But Keating lost office in 1996. As a political strategy his replacement John Howard promised instead a Constitutional Convention. Once this convention, held in February 1998, gave the go-ahead to proceed a referendum was scheduled on November 6 1999.

What happened in 1999 and why?

First, what happened? The referendum campaign became a battle between opposing coalitions. The YES committee, chaired by Malcolm Turnbull, was composed of ARM members, members of Andrew Robb's Conservatives for an Australian Head of State, and parliamentary supporters from Labor, Liberals and the Democrats. The NO committee, chaired by Kerry Jones, comprised Australians for Constitutional Monarchy, Ted Mack and Phil Cleary from the Real Republicans and parliamentary supporters from the Liberals and the Nationals (Jones 2000).

The referendum lost clearly by 55% to 45%. All six states voted NO and only the Australian Capital Territory voted YES. Victoria, the most republican state, voted 49.8% YES, while the least republican state, Queensland, only voted 37.4% YES. Tasmania was the second least republican state with a 40.4% YES vote.

Analysis of the results by electorate by Malcolm Mackerras and William Maley (2002) drew three conclusions. First, that YES voting was "an inner metropolitan phenomenon" (p 110). Secondly, that YES voting accorded with higher income and socio-economic status (p 110). Thirdly, that the referendum split the republican vote so much that a majority of NO voters "identified themselves to pollsters as being republicans" (p 89). Mackerras and Maley estimate that, compared to the 1998 federal election, Labor voters voted 57-43 YES, Liberals 35-65 YES and Nationals 20-80 YES (p 89). The Labor republican vote was particularly disappointing, and there was less support among Liberal voters than among Liberal parliamentarians, led by Peter Costello.

Ian McAllister has conducted a survey analysis based on the 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Study (2001). He examined four important explanations for voting behaviour: party and elite cues to voting, the republic as an elite initiative, the British link and hopes and fears of change. He concluded that the most important influence on voting behaviour was the link with Britain (the nationalist argument). The hopes and fears of change, such as Australia's independence and the stability of the political system were next. Parties and their leaders were of some importance, while knowledge of politics and views of politicians were last in importance (but still important). Because the least interested and least informed voters were there ones who only voted if compelled to do so, McAllister calculated that if voting had been voluntary the YES vote would have risen to about 51%-53%. This would have been enough to win NSW and Victoria, but still not enough to carry four states.

Why did it happen? There are a host of explanations. Among the several orthodox explanations there are two types that carry some weight.

The first is a general structural or institutional explanation which sees the republic issue as the most recent of a long line of referenda that have suffered from a combination of lack of bipartisanship, public ignorance and/or apathy, and the difficulty of achieving a double majority whatever the question. John Howard's opposition to his own government's proposal made it especially difficult on this occasion.

The second orthodox approach is a more particular campaigning explanation that emphasises that the YES case was outgeneralled by the NO side led by Australians for Constitutional Monarchy. The ingredients of this explanation include the alleged weaknesses and unattractiveness of the parliamentary appointment of the president model, and the republican disunity that led to the Real Republicans campaigning for the NO side. Some critics would also add that the government's education campaign was not only ineffective but positively misleading. Other critics believe that the fault lies with the wrong model being put forward. According to this view the referendum would have passed if the direct election model had been put forward (Kelley et al 2002). Therefore, according to this view, the ARM was at fault for not pushing for such a model at the referendum by compromising its position at the Constitutional Convention.

Apart from the orthodox explanations there is also a very important third explanation that concentrates on public distrust of politicians in particular and elites in general. This explanation would see the slogan "Say No to the Politicians' Republic" as being especially important. This explanation explains the NO vote as similar in kind to support for the Pauline Hanson One Nation party and linked to high levels of popular scepticism about the political process.

Many of these impediments can be addressed by the republican movement, during or before a future referendum campaign. But the hurdles are formidable. It is feasible that a second referendum could have both bipartisan support and united republican support, though each will be difficult to achieve. Realistically, even if bipartisan political leadership can be achieved in the short to medium term, considerable opposition to a republic will continue to exist within the Coalition parties. Likewise, republican unity will be tested whatever model is chosen as a considerable number of republicans are strongly committed to their preferred model. Some even prefer the status quo to a non-preferred republican model. It is feasible that the concept of a directly elected president could be the chosen model. But parliamentary appointment republicans would then need to be convinced to vote YES. Furthermore, Australian political culture and public distrust probably will not change and the mechanisms of the referendum process itself must be worked within (though note John Uhr's suggested reforms in Uhr 2002).

The task before republicans is a large one. The republican movement cannot afford as many 'defectors' from their ranks next time as occurred in 1999. Republicans should note carefully that both Mackerras and Maley and McAllister doubt that such a referendum will ever be successful. Each believes that republican disunity is the key. McAllister notes that only once has a once defeated referendum question been passed at a second attempt (p 268). McAllister believes that the populists (republicans who voted No in 1999) are the key (pp 265-266). He concludes with reference to a successful second referendum (p 268): Such a precedent would require either elite acceptance of the principle of popular election of the head of state, or voter acceptance that selection of the head of state should remain in the hands of the elite. The former would require a major change of opinion among the elite; the latter would require either an unprecedented commitment to voter education or a shift to a system of voluntary voting. Neither of these is likely to come about, at least in the medium term.

Mackerras and Maley argue that the constitutional monarchy is a ' Condorcet winner'. That is, they believe that the monarchy is an option that "even if it is not supported by a majority, can garner enough support to defeat any alternative" (p 111). They see the two alternatives as being represented by two 'hostile camps' of republicans: "those concerned with national symbols and those concerned with popular empowerment" (p 111). The latter worked to defeat the brand of 'republic' on offer, since this was the only way to keep 'their' republic alive. Should 'their' republic one day be on offer, it is by no means certain that those who voted for a nominal republic in 1999 would support a substantive republic at that time. One does not have to accept Mackerras and Maley's terminology ("nominal" and "substantive") to see the point they are making. Republicans should be realistic.

The Australian Republican Movement Past and Present

From conception to the referendum:

The ARM was conceived in late 1990 and made its first public appearance in July 1991 (Turnbull 1993). Its first committee was chaired by the writer Thomas Keneally and comprised about a dozen Sydney-based republicans including Malcolm Turnbull. In April 1993 Paul Keating, recently re-elected, announced that Turnbull would chair a Republic Advisory Committee (RAC). That committee reported in October 1993 (Commonwealth of Australia 1993).

The 1990s were a heady period for the ARM. The Keating government committed itself in 1993 to a republic by 2001 and the then ARM chairman, Turnbull, lawyer and merchant banker, became a government insider when he was chosen to head the RAC. After the Howard government took office in March 1996 the ARM no longer had a sympathetic ally in Canberra. But it operated in an invigorating campaign environment with elections in November-December 1997 for the membership of half of the Constitutional Convention, the Convention itself in February 1998, and finally the Republic referendum on 6 November 1999.

The three years and a half years since then have been very different. The government remains unenthusiastic and the Prime Minister has discouraged discussion within the Coalition parties. The Labor Opposition did propose a series of plebiscites on the Republic as part of its platform for the November 2001 federal elections. Nevertheless the issue has featured only sporadically on the public agenda. For many the issue is dead though public opinion polls continue to show that a clear majority of Australians are republican in sentiment (Australian 15 November 2002).

The traditional ARM strategies were first getting the issue on the public agenda and then running campaigns. They were dictated from 1997 onwards by the need to elect delegates to the Constitutional Convention and then to run the YES campaign for the referendum. Between times the need was to obtain regular publicity for the central message about the desirability of an Australian Head of State to replace the British Queen. This publicity was achieved primarily by the personal efforts in the media and elsewhere by Turnbull, Neville Wran and the other leaders of the organisation. They donated money to the ARM, wrote books and newspaper articles and took every opportunity to advance the republican cause. This was supplemented on occasions by generating the support of a number of prominent Australians. Sometimes this support involved large fundraising events in Sydney with speakers such as the writer Robert Hughes and the diplomat Richard Butler.

The ARM's campaign for the Constitutional Convention elections was self-funded, largely by Turnbull himself and a few of the other ARM candidates. The major source of publicity came from the choice of many 'household names' in politics, business, sport and the media to head the ARM tickets in the bigger states (Vizard 1998: 6-7; Turnbull 1999: 28-29). They included Eddie McGuire, Steve Vizard, Mary Delahunty and Lindsay Fox from Victoria, Wran, Wendy Machin, Hazel Hawke and Turnbull himself from NSW, Sally-Anne Atkinson from Queensland and Janet Holmes a Court from Western Australia.

The YES campaign strategy for the 1999 referendum into which the ARM's campaign was merged was publicly funded to the tune of $7.5 million. The national campaign was fought like an election campaign. In constructing its strategy the ARM had the benefit of the best professional brains available drawn from both sides of politics (Turnbull 1999; Barns 2002). The YES Advertising Committee was Turnbull, former Liberal Party national director Andrew Robb, Labor strategist Peter Barron and the former Democrats senator Karen Sowada. The advertising agency was Singleton Ogilvy Mather and the research firm was ANOP.

The ARM campaign concentrated on the nationalist case for an Australian Head of State. The main message was: "We are Australian". Three former prime ministers, Malcolm Fraser, Gough Whitlam and Bob Hawke were used in both free and paid advertising. Fraser, in particular, had a very high rating in the community. (Barns 2002: 61).

Like all national election campaigns this central campaign was supported by state and local campaigns. These lower-level campaigns were very different to the national campaign as the ARM was a loose-knit organisation. They relied on the traditional approaches such as letter-boxing of materials paid for out of central campaign funds (often with the support of political party members), participation in local events such as debates, and creative local publicity through stunts and other media opportunities.

More inventive approaches came from associated republican organisations. The YES Coalition in Sydney produced T-Shirts with messages that apparently outraged our opponents, such as "Give an Australian the Head Job" and "Rooting for the Republic" (Turnbull 1999: 109). Young Australians for a Republic and Women for an Australian Republic invited supporters to "Put the Pub into RePUBlic" and "down a Crownie"

Rebuilding the ARM:

After the 1999 defeat the ARM went through a searching process of introspection and rebuilding. The first six months of 2000 were spent debating the future and agreeing on the constitutional structure of a new organisation. Everything was on the table including the name of the organisation. Eventually it was decided to keep the 'brand name' but the new constitution produced a new structure. The organisation, now smaller, was managed by a new national director, Jim Terrie, operating with the support of volunteers out of a pro bono Sydney office. The national director, now Allison Henry, remains the only paid ARM employee.

Elections for a new national committee were held in August 2000. The national committee now comprised 8 members directly elected by the whole membership, a youth member elected by the whole youth membership and 8 ex-officio state and territory conveners heading elected state and territory councils. The new committee was representative of a broader range of republicans, including a number of 'names', such as Rev Tim Costello, then Democrats' deputy leader Natasha Stott Despoja and young lawyer Jason Li, from outside the former ARM. The new chair, Greg Barns, had been campaign director in 1999. He believed the ARM now had to listen to the community and debate the issues "in church halls, rotary groups, shop-fronts and party meetings. Its going to be a whole lot of work and not a lot of glory" (Steketee 2000). The two deputy chairs were former Labor senator Susan Ryan and Anne Witheford, the ACT convener and Constitutional Convention delegate. Other significant new leaders included the NSW state convener, Rev Dorothy McRae McMahon. Witheford was latter replaced by Richard Fidler.

The ARM needed to rebuild its membership, which had fallen from about 8,000 to 1500 and was still below 3, 000 in August 2000. The strategy had to be to grow the grass-roots. It also had to be inclusive of all republicans. The first step in achieving this was a change in objective from a single parliamentary appointment of the president model to a decision to leave the choice of model to the Australian people. The ARM now aims to build bridges and to represent all republicans.

The next step was to develop a new image. The new slogan, "Our Republic: The next step" was build around the Centenary of Federation year in 2001. The ARM emphasised the comparisons between the struggle for Federation in the 1890s, with its defeats, lulls and pitfalls along the way and the struggle for an Australian Head of State in the new millennium (see ARM membership leaflet).

In September 2002 a second election was held and a new executive was elected. John Warhurst became the new chair and Jason Li joined Susan Ryan as a deputy chair. Neither Barns nor Turnbull stood for those elections and so ceased to be members of the National Committee. A sea change of sorts had occurred.

Where is the republic issue now?

Public opinion polls suggest that community opinion has not changed very much since November 1999. Majority support for the republic has neither increased nor fallen.

The most extensive recent poll was the November 2002 Newspoll (The Australian November 15 2002). This survey of public opinion shows that a majority of Australians favour Australia becoming a republic (51% to 35%). 64% of Labor voters are in favour compared with 37% of Coalition voters. An overwhelming majority still favour a president directly elected by the people if Australia does become a republic (79%). 95% believe that Australia's head of state should be an Australian. There is a considerable gender gap evident. 57% of men but only 46% of women favour a republic. 54% think that another referendum should be held within five years and 77% within 10 years. However, 54% think that the republic issue is a "distraction from Australia's real problems".

These opinions are both an encouragement and a reality check for republicans. They show that a majority of Australians share republican goals, but they also show that only a minority share republicans' enthusiasm for immediate action. Perhaps the most perplexing statistical difference is between those who favour a republic and those who believe that our head of state should be an Australian. As Paul Kelly has suggested (Kelly 2002), this group, which may be as large as 40%, may be divided: between those who believe that the Governor General is Australia's Head of State and so cannot see any problem with the current arrangements, and those who do not, but are still unwilling on balance to support constitutional change to a republic whatever type of republic is proposed.

The political party situation is also not much different to what it was in 1999.

The Labor party remains formally republican and took to the 2001 federal election a proposal to hold a series of plebiscites beginning with a general plebiscite on the principle of becoming a republic. But the party is divided between parliamentary republicans, such as NSW Premier Bob Carr, and popular election republicans, such as deputy leader, Jenny Macklin.

The Liberal Party leadership remains divided between Howard and Costello. The new generation elected since 1999 is still split and is not noticeably more republican. For instance, leading monarchist, Sophie Panopoulos, now holds the seat of Indi for the Liberals. Most Liberals, including Costello, are parliamentary republicans as was the case in 1999, and quite a few prefer the ultra minimalist McGarvie model. The climate of opinion within the party is still not conducive to open discussion of the issue. Not only is Howard committed to the status quo, but he has made it clear that he does not wish the issue to be discussed publicly. His retirement would open up debate within the party, but it would not magically transform it. Monarchists such as Tony Abbott and Nick Minchin would remain in very senior positions, even if Turnbull and Robb were to enter the Liberal Party party room at the next election.

The Nationals remain formally republican. The most interesting development since 1999 has been Tim Fischer's open support for an Australian Head of State. This was prefigured in 1999 but never actually happened. However, by the time of the December 2001 Corowa Convention he was an openly enthusiastic republican (Fischer 2001).

The Democrats are declared republicans, but they are divided between parliamentary appointment and direct election. At the Australian Constitutional Futures Conference in Brisbane on 17 November 2002 the Democrats Leader Senator Andrew Bartlett announced the Democrats' intention to push for a parliamentary inquiry into the republic during 2003 (Bartlett 2002; Canberra Times November 18 2002.

The Greens are yet to devote much attention to the issue but they are republican in spirit and likely to support popular election of the president

There have been some interesting developments at the state level. Since 1999 Labor has surged in state politics. While in 1999 the Liberals controlled state governments everywhere but NSW and, belatedly, in Victoria, now Labor is in office in all states and territories. Opposition leaders at the time of the 1998 Constitutional Convention such as Geoff Gallop, Mike Rann, Peter Beattie and Jim Bacon are now state premiers, as well as Steve Bracks in Victoria. Bracks has declared that he wants to open up the process of appointing the state governor in the spirit of republicanism, while Beattie has recently allowed for parliamentary debate after his latest gubernatorial appointment.

What are republicans doing?

Current ARM Strategies:

Current ARM strategy has a number of elements. Its first priority is to continue to build its grass-roots organisation. Its particular focus is on those parts of Australia outside the inner metropolitan areas (where its level of support is high and virtually impregnable). Where possible the ARM sets up new branches in outer-metropolitan areas, like Parramatta and Cronulla in Sydney, and in regional areas like Armidale in northern NSW. It is also aware of the need to build greater support among women and young people.

Secondly, the ARM continues to maintain contact with commonwealth parliamentarians, in whose hands the immediate future of the issue rests. It does this both formally through submissions to committees where possible and informally by working with back-benchers. It is helpful to have one sitting MP, Senator Marise Payne, and two former MPs on the ARM National Committee. The organisation remains absolutely non-partisan.

In achieving its aims the ARM has tried to balance the longer term with more immediate goals. Its immediate goal is a plebiscite, rather than a referendum, at the soonest possible date (realistically this will not occur until after the 2004 federal election). This plebiscite or non-binding vote would ask the general question whether or not Australians support becoming a republic. The longer-term goal of another Republic referendum realistically will not occur much before 2009, a decade after the previous referendum.

There are a number of limitations to what the ARM can do. The first is relative poverty. Raising money through donations in the absence of a campaign is not easy. This lack of money can be overcome by all of the usual unfunded activities, such as visiting schools, letter-writing and holding community stalls. Another strategy is to participate in alliances or in activities organised by others. There have been two recent examples of such activities. The ARM took up the invitation issued by the organisers of The Peoples Conference at Corowa in December 2001 (www.corowaconference.com.au). Barns spoke officially and many ARM members participated. Last November the ARM co-sponsored a major conference in Brisbane with The Australian newspaper and Griffith University on Australian Constitutional Futures: The Nature of our Future Nation (www.griffith.edu.au/conference/acf2002).

The second difficulty is trying to take advantage of media opportunities without being trapped into misrepresentation of ARM's core message. Recent events involving the Royal Family and the Governor-General are minefields for republicans because cheap publicity can be tempting but dangerous. It is counter-productive if mainstream Australia is offended and it also upsets some ARM members. Even opinion pieces by ARM writers are hostage to headlines and accompanying cartoons that distort the message. For instance, the first opinion piece by the new ARM chair was illustrated by a cartoon linking the republic to Prince Charles and the Queen in a way the text had not done (Warhurst 2002)

A third issue surrounds the use of the Internet for communication in a grass-roots organisation. The Internet is much cheaper to use but communicating with members by e-mail tends to disenfranchise a significant minority who do not have Internet access. The ARM maintains an uneasy compromise on this matter by mixing newsletters with e-mail lists.

Other Republicans:

There are a number of other republicans active in political life, mostly as individuals rather than groups. The job of the ARM chair and state conveners is to maintain good working relations with each of them. The ARM does not expect to appeal to all republicans, but the next best thing to a single organisation is an alliance of friends in a loose coalition of interest.

Perhaps the best known until his death earlier this year was Richard McGarvie, author of the ultra-minimalist McGarvie model at the Constitutional Convention and instigator of the Corowa conference (McGarvie 1999). His associate, Jack Hammond QC, continues to press for discussion of the republic issue in State parliaments, as a precursor to federal-state negotiation in a forum such as the Council of Australian Governments. Hammond is currently lobbying the Victorian parliament to consider a draft bill.

The influential Sydney stockbroker, Jim Bain, leads a small group of republicans known as the Democracy First Group (DFG), with access to the Prime Minister. DFG proposes a directly elected head of state and a 36 member constitutional council (Australian May 1 2002; Democracy First Group 2002; see also Australian October 2 2002)

The most active of the former Conservatives for an Australian Head of State is Prof Greg Craven, Dean of Law at Notre Dame University in Perth. Craven forcefully advocates the minimalist position as the only one likely to ever win the support of Peter Costello and the bulk of the Liberal Party republicans.

The Australian Workers Union, in February this year, became the first Australian union to resolve to support an Australian republic with an Australian head of state (AWU 2003).

There are fewer inheritors of the case for popular election outside the ARM. Of the Real Republicans Phil Cleary is the only one now active in public life (The Age September 19 2002). Labor MP Lindsay Tanner has advocated direct election both in the course of critical remarks about the ARM (The Age September 17 2002) and in a later welcome address to the Victorian conference of the ARM (Tanner 2002). Senator Andrew Murray (Democrats, WA), one of the parliamentary authors of the official NO case, continues to advocate popular election (Murray 2003). The long-established Republican Party of Australia, headed by Peter Consandine, is a community-based organisation committed to a popularly elected president. They recently announced that Dr Helen Irving was their Republican of the Year. But there is as yet no national organisation of direct-election republicans.

Finally, there are a significant number of independent academic and other voices with particular programs, such as Prof George Winterton and Dr Helen Irving. At the Corowa Conference in December 2001 "The Corowa Four", Bill Peach AM, Professor George Winterton, Dr Walter Phillips and Dr Bede Harris sponsored the successful Royal Hotel Resolution. This resolution outlined a process beginning with a multi-party Commonwealth Parliament Joint Committee. But nothing has yet come of this initiative. The historian of republicanism Dr Mark McKenna (McKenna 1996) advocates a rethinking of the republican vision by linking the reconciliation and republican movements (McKenna 2003). Others favour embedding republicanism within an even broader program of constitutional reform. The ARM remains focussed on the Head of State issue, though recognising the contribution of other approaches to revitalisation of community interest in constitutional change.

2003:

The ARM has a number of priorities in 2003. First it wants to generate support for an agreed way forward. It has just published a paper on the way forward to stimulate debate among members and the general republican community (Constitutional Issues Committee 2003). In this paper by its Constitutional Issues Committee the ARM outlines three alternative processes to resolve the Head of State issue. Each begins with a general plebiscite.

In the first the plebiscite is followed by a parliamentary committee, then a fully-elected Constitutional Convention to select the model, and finally the necessary parliamentary legislation.

In the second the initial plebiscite is followed by a second plebiscite to choose the model, then a fully-elected Constitutional Convention to draft the detail, and finally the necessary parliamentary legislation.

In the third the plebiscite includes both the general question and the choice of model simultaneously, followed by a Constitutional Convention and parliamentary legislation.

The key differences between the three alternatives are whether the model will be chosen by plebiscite or by a constitutional convention, and whether there should be two separate plebiscites or one with two questions.

Secondly, the ARM is rebuilding its youth support, especially in universities, and has begun the process of setting up republican clubs in a number of universities across the country.

Thirdly, the ARM is enlarging and solidifying its Commonwealth parliamentary support, which is already considerable (more than 30 MPs are ARM members as well as an even larger number of staff). In the medium term this will involve the formation of a cross-party parliamentary republican group.

Finally, the ARM is undertaking its own curriculum initiatives to address the need for greater civics education in our schools. It continues to take every opportunity to speak in schools and at Schools' Constitutional Conventions.

What is the future of the issue?

Conclusion:

The ARM, which remains central to advancing the republic issue, has strengths and weaknesses. It is an organisation rich in talent and enthusiasm among its members but poor financially. It is still tagged as elitist to its detriment and its membership is heavily inner-metropolitan. The ARM is still identified with the 1999 loss and bears some ill-will because of it. It includes among its members both parliamentary and popular election republicans. As an organisation it is deliberately not committed to either. Rather it will accept the voters' verdict. Its goal has the support of the Labor Party, the Greens and the Democrats but not yet of the two Coalition parties. But it represents the view of the clear majority of Australians even if the support of many of them for an Australian Head of State is lethargic. Most importantly it represents a most important strand in Australian life that stands for Australian national symbols.

The ARM's strategy is to build an organisation with the spread and strength to campaign effectively whenever another opportunity comes. At the same time it wants to contribute to bringing about that opportunity as soon as possible through encouraging its parliamentary supporters to act (as the Senate is now doing), and by assisting in defining the intellectual and practical issues for them.

While circumstances such as world events and political leadership remain unhelpful to republicans the ARM will take the opportunity to rebuild. It needs a larger membership, especially in those electorates that voted No in 1999. It needs majority support in all major political parties. It needs a continuing presence at all levels in the community. While the ARM understands that an Australian head of state is a long-term project, it is committed to the achievable short-term objective of a plebiscite to confirm majority community support for the idea. Republicans must agree on process, even if they cannot yet agree on the detail of a republic.

National identity remains the core reason for being a republican in Australia. Following the resolution of the Iraq War these identity issues will have room to flourish. The war will make Australians think anew about our identity in the world.

Republicans need to continue to make and take their opportunities. The recent controversy over the Governor-General, Dr Peter Hollingworth, was one chance to argue the issues and to educate the community. A trigger for change would certainly help to provide an opportunity in the short to medium term. That trigger could be a change of Coalition Prime Minister from John Howard to Peter Costello, or a change of government from Coalition to Labor.

It could be Labor realising that the issue is a winner for them. At least 64% of Labor voters are republican. This was a point David Solomon made at the Australian Constitutional Futures conference in Brisbane in November 2002. But Labor has yet to take that opportunity.

It could be the death of the popular Queen Elizabeth II and a transition to monarch of the more distant King Charles.

But none of these triggers will be enough in themselves and the ARM is not relying on them. The initiative must come from parliamentarians. All political parties should see it as their responsibility to have a program on the table before the next federal election. Australians deserve another chance.

Just about all republicans are agreed upon a national plebiscite in principle. The ARM believes that should happen as soon as possible. Parliamentarians would discover, once they acted, that there would be substantial community support for such a move.

Once a plebiscite has passed then the really hard work for republicans begins. Resolution of republican differences would then become the highest priority. Such differences can only be resolved by compromise and by the legitimacy that would follow extensive community involvement in choosing the model. Even then some republicans will almost certainly still vote NO. That is why the republican movement must aim to lift support for the general idea at a plebiscite to at least 70%. Only then can it be confidently predicted that a second republican referendum will pass in four or more states. For this to happen the YES vote will need to be at least 55% nation-wide and possibly closer to 60%.

The ARM is delighted that the Senate Legal and Constitutional Reference Committee, with Senator Nick Bolkus as chair and Senator Marise Payne as deputy chair, announced on 26 June 2003 that the Senate had voted to support an enquiry into the republic (Stott Despoja and Bolkus 2003). This enquiry, to be conducted over the next six to nine months, will allow the ARM to present its program for the future of the republic campaign to a parliamentary audience. And it will certainly boost the profile of the issue among the general public through widespread public hearings. The exercise will be the best opportunity for some time to demonstrate, in the words of Senators Bolkus and Stott Despoja that: "The republic is well and truly back on the political agenda and gaining momentum".

REFERENCES

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