| Thank
you, Mr Chairman. I join with the Prime Minister in welcoming
delegates to this Constitutional Convention. You have
no idea what joy it brings me to see you sitting here
and properly using this chamber - a chamber which I loved
so much and which I deeply regret leaving.
There must be a sense of excitement among us here today
as, a century on, to some extent we stand in the shoes
of the founders of our nation.
We cannot claim to be writing on a canvas as large as
theirs. We cannot claim their erudition. Nobody who
reads those proceedings can be anything other than amazed
by the capacity of such a large number of people to
consider so well such complex issues. And we cannot
match the sense that they were creating a nation.
Their meeting followed a more intense and extensive
public debate than ours does, but we can claim to be
dealing with their unfinished business: their having
created a nation, our meeting reflects the maturing
of that nation - not least in the fact that there are
women, young people, indigenous Australians and many
people from a non Anglo-Celtic background at this Convention.
Most importantly, we are reflecting our nation's recognition
of its identity in a much changed world.
The evolutionary process that the founders of our nation
were engaged in naturally reflected the sentiment of
the day. In a period in which we were essentially Australian
Britons, with a deep sense of being part of an empire,
ambiguity was inevitable in our Constitution where the
ties to our polity of origin were considered. The surprising
feature of our Constitution, given this background,
is not in its manifestation of those ties but in the
hints of a republican direction. Much in it reflects
attention to the republican benchmark of the day, the
constitution of the United States.
Further, as Queen Victoria thoroughly understood at
the time, the Commonwealth of Australia is an unambiguously
republican title. When those of us who served on the
last government's cabinet subcommittee started tinkering
with the names 'Republic of Australia' or 'Federal Republic
of Australia', we rapidly concluded: why bother.
The opposition's view is that we should now complete
the founders' agenda. We have always believed that the
things which unite us in this debate are greater than
the things which divide us. All of us here, I think,
believe in the small 'r' republican view that the Australian
people should participate actively in the civic life
of the nation. In other words, we share a view of citizenship
- essentially a republican concept.
We are all citizens of an independent, self-governing
nation in which government is carried out through the
people's elected representatives. Our nation is a republic
in all but name. We argue that we as a nation should
recognise the reality of our small 'r' republican arrangements
by making the necessary adjustments to place the capping
stone on the structure: a head of state who is unambiguously
Australian; a head of state who is one of us.
As I look around this chamber here today, I see the
clearest message that the Australian people - those
who voted - could give about their feelings on the issue
of a republic. Standing here today, it is impossible
to ignore the clear preference expressed in the votes
for this Convention for the move to an Australian republic.
The Australian people did not vote for a train wreck
at this Convention, and they must not get one.
I believe Australians voted for republican candidates
because they recognise that Australia approaching the
21st century makes it own way in our region and in the
world and our institutions must reflect that fact.
We are recognised by other countries for our distinctive
achievements in fields as disparate as sport, the arts,
political institutions, and science and technology.
Those same countries that have learned to prize a vibrant,
confident, outward looking Australia find it strange
and anachronistic - as many Australians now clearly
do - that our head of state is not an Australian.
Australians elected a majority republican convention
because, far from seeing dangers in the move to a republic,
they see potential problems with a system of government
with which, increasingly, Australians cannot wholly
identify. They see the danger inherent in a system which
does not enjoy the confidence of its people - confidence
that it represents their vision of their own future
- and that confidence is part of political stability.
What greater proof of relevance to the lives and aspirations
of ordinary Australians could our system of government
have than the knowledge that any Australian child could
one day become Australia's head of state. For us in
the ALP, this is a moment of some satisfaction. This
Convention is not our idea, and we think its methods
of election and appointment flawed. We do not resile
from our views that things should have been done a different
way.
However, we knew that, when we placed the republican
motion in our platform under Bill Hayden's leadership
in 1982, if the objective was to be achieved it could
never be done on the basis that we owned the process.
When Prime Minister Paul Keating courageously and firmly
placed the issue on the Australian political agenda
a decade later, he reiterated that conviction. However,
he and his government believed that a workable model
should be put into play as well as just simply canvassing
the issue. The model was subsequently unveiled in June
1995, and it remains our preferred model.
We advocated, and the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party
continues to advocate, this minimalist model. It contains
an important feature which I want to raise in the context
of our deliberations this week. Labor's model provides
for the election of an Australian president on the nomination
of the Prime Minister and the cabinet by a two-thirds
majority of a joint sitting of both houses of parliament.
Our view is that this method of election causes the
minimum possible disruption to our current constitutional
arrangements. It is the model most likely to produce
a nonpartisan figure and, as such, the breadth of public
support a head of state must enjoy. It does not remove
the head of state from accountability to an elected,
essentially partisan process - the parliament of Australia.
However, there would be substantial checks against the
virulent exercise of partisanship should a clash between
the head of state and parliament's majority occur.
We still think appointment by parliament balances a
desire to have an Australian head of state above the
political process, with accountability to the elected
aspects of it. Others don't agree. We recognise that
there are other views and other models. In particular,
we recognise that when asked Australians express a clear
preference for a president directly elected by the people.
Some weeks ago our highest policy making body, the National
Conference, took note of that fact.
Clearly, such a model demands significant constitutional
change. In particular, as our National Conference noted,
it would require the codification and limitation of
the powers of the head of state and attention to the
respective powers of the House of Representatives and
the Senate.
Our concern when we were in government was articulated
many times by Paul Keating. He argued, correctly I believe,
that a president so elected would have greater political
legitimacy and greater powers than the current Governor-General,
and those to the detriment of the House of Representatives
and of the cabinet. Such a president could scarcely
be 'above politics' as Governors-General have been almost
exclusively in our history. The paradox for so many
people who oppose election by parliament is of course
that a popularly elected president would almost inevitably
be a politician, and one from the major parties at that.
Yet it is to avoid such an outcome that many arrive
at that position.
But this is just one element in the convictions of many
who advocate this model. A deeper view stems from the
sentiment that, having decided to change, many want
to feel personal ownership of that change.
For those of us who lead a daily life in politics like
I, we tend to forget that the point of identification
of our citizens or the process is not the institutions
in which we sit and their personalities but the act
of voting. If such views are not to be adopted, then
great care and rigour in argument will need to be exercised.
Similarly, we recognise the presence of proposals for
absolutely minimal change such as the so-called 'McGarvie
model' in which the head of state has, in effect, exactly
the same powers as the present Governor-General and
is appointed or dismissed on the Prime Minister's advice.
We believe the most significant difficulty with such
a model is that it allows insufficient participation
by the Australian people - either directly in an election
or indirectly via their parliamentary representatives
- to have a say in the election of their president.
In comparing all these models, as we are charged with
doing over the coming days, there is one thing of which
we will all need to be aware and should factor into
our thinking: the balances in our political system have
their unwritten subtleties. They go beyond simply the
conventions that the Governor-General acts on the advice
of the Prime Minister and cabinet, but they are related
to it. Any of the models we consider will to some extent
rebalance the political process in this country. Even
the McGarvie model, with its presiding panel of notables,
does this. The events of 1975 probably started this
debate, but they were exceptional. The clear reality
of political life is one in which the government of
the day exercises great power in relation to the Governor-General,
with the capacity to appoint and remove him or her.
The expectation in all areas of the political system
is that, whatever else is going on in the legislature,
the most crucial decisions by the Governor-General on
any matter will be based on the advice of the government.
Any process that changes that appointment and removal
procedure - placing it in the hands of a panel, the
legislature or the electorate - produces a subtle rebalancing
which will be apparent to Prime Ministers immediately,
but will ultimately permeate all other elements of the
political process - particularly the legislature, particularly
the Senate.
As we move from a constitutional monarchy reliant on
unwritten convention, is it possible for a republican
constitution to be similarly based when a central underpinning
of that unwritten convention, the basis of the tenure
of the Governor-General, is substantially changed? If
this is the case, is it possible after all under any
model to avoid the need to codify other powers and the
relations between the various political institutions?
In answering these questions, we must understand convention
itself as a great Australian republican tradition. In
the final analysis, it is the beliefs of the Australian
people as to how government should be run that constrain
the exercise of power under our Constitution.
Labor believes it is the task of this Convention to
resolve these issues. We do not seek to pretend that
these debates are simple or that such matters do not
require careful thought and deliberation. The stability
of our democratic system of government is one of our
greatest achievements as a nation and not one we would
ever want to see endangered. Equally, we believe that
Australians and their special representatives gathered
here this week are capable of the thought, the deliberation
and the great wisdom required to make this change a
reality.
We put our faith in the great traditions of Australian
democratic innovation. We are skilled democrats. Not
many people know that around the world the secret ballot
is known as the Australian ballot. We are among the
pioneers in women's suffrage and preferential voting.
This great tradition of innovation is also a central
support of our stable Australian democracy.
We have created great political institutions, both official
and unofficial, and have produced a system that places
an emphasis on honesty, fairness and stability. We can
conclude the final steps to an Australian head of state
proud of our record and with faith in our capacity to
handle this debate.
The next step after this Convention must be a direct
appeal to the people who put some of us here this week.
By that time, this issue will have been discussed long
enough. In my view, Australians have long understood
most of the issues. We can take this opportunity to
give those issues a final push forward. Then we must
give Australians their say.
Because Australia faces great challenges, establishing
an Australian republic is an important part of meeting
those challenges, though we must always remember not
the foremost among them. It will help us project a new
identity, but one which, in reality, we have felt for
a long time now - an identity as a strong, confident
and independent young nation, engaged with the world
around it and excited by the opportunities attaching
to its place in the world.
The questions we must face should make the next fortnight
an intellectual treat for us all as well as a challenge.
This Convention is an experiment in so far as it stands
outside the processes the founders considered the basis
for future constitutional change. It does, however,
have the chance to enshrine itself as a useful adjunct
to those processes if we can deal with the complex issues
with the breadth of mind that has thus far eluded the
institutions formally charged with the task of constitutional
change.
No matter what we do here in these two weeks we will
all create history. The challenge is to ensure that
when it is written its judges will be able to say that
we tackled the issues with intelligence and gave a genuine
reflection of an independent Australian nation. Thank
you.
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