The federation of the Australasian colonies and the creation of the Commonwealth of Australia formed a new national government, a new nation. It was a new shoot from an old tree, in time a new shoot that would grow to maturity and stand independently and self-sufficiently.

It would, for all purposes, be free and self-standing although unquestionably it had been derived from another.

Some of the delegates to the Convention have argued for a republic as the last step to independence. Some have spoken of it as a decision to leave home. To be frank, I find this line of argument repulsive and, needless to say, unconvincing. It has never occurred to me in my lifetime that Australia was not an independent nation. I have never seen any evidence of its independence being compromised by its constitutional arrangements, and I venture to say that all those who have represented it internationally have done so on the basis that its sovereignty lies solely in Australia and is understood to do so by its neighbours in the world community without question.

It is also argued by some of the proponents for a republic that if in reality the nation is completely independent, even a de facto republic, the wording of the Constitution should be changed to match the reality. But, to be frank, the words and the reality of our constitution are at variance in so many areas that if the aim was a matching one - words to reality - we would start in more important places than this. The Constitution makes no mention of a cabinet, an obvious feature of our government. It makes no mention of a first or prime minister, which is an obvious feature of the government.

I mention these examples to illustrate the point that the Constitution must be read and understood in accordance with history and convention. This is the case with all great historic literature, especially where we are looking for modern meanings in ancient texts.

It is practically impossible to formulate a comprehensive written manual to apply to the myriad of human behaviour. Even more so, I believe it to be practically impossible to write a comprehensive manual to cover circumstances now and circumstances now unthought of but certain to arise in future centuries. This is one of the weaknesses of a written constitution. It is not unique to Australia. It is a problem we share with those other countries that have decided to reduce and enshrine their constitutions in one written document.

It is sometimes also said that the Constitution is not an inspirational document, not a document which states values or ideals. This may be so, but for my own part I do not think this an especial weakness. I am not convinced the purpose of a constitution is to uplift the soul. In my view the purpose of a constitution is to set out the basis for responsible and civil government to allow a society in which language and literature, hopes and aspirations that can uplift a soul will flourish.

Our constitution starts with the historic institution of the monarchy of Great Britain and adapts that office successfully by history and conventions to modern Australia. As adapted and applied, it works remarkably well and yet if there were not a substantial disquiet over the institution, a disquiet likely to grow rather than recede, we would not be here. It was this disquiet, recognised by the current government, which led it in opposition to pledge to hold this convention, if elected. The Convention is taking place in fulfilment of that election pledge.

It is commonly said that all this argument is about is whether we want an Australian as our head of state. If that were all we wanted, one of the options to fix it would be an Australian monarchy but, in truth, the problem is more the concept of monarchy itself. The temper of the times is democratic; we are uncomfortable with an office that appoints people by hereditary. In our society in our time we prefer appointment by merit.

The system works well but a key concept behind it bruises against reality. The only active role now left for the monarch to perform is, upon the advice of the Prime Minister, to appoint the Governor-General and, on the advice of the Prime Minister, to dismiss the Governor-General. If this function were to be performed by a council, there would be no significant change to the current structure of our institutions. The Governor-General, by convention an Australian, would be appointed to hold executive powers subject to the restraints and conventions of the Westminster system of government. The active function of the Crown would be taken over by an Australian or Australians appointed on the basis of service or merit.

More importantly, there is every reason to believe that conventions that have been established and adopted under the current arrangements would continue. This is because the office of Governor-General would continue by whatever name. It is logical to think that the exercise of the power of appointment and dismissal would continue under the same conventions. The proposal along these lines, known as the McGarvie model, is one that I would support without hesitation.

I turn now to the question of whether we should go further. Under our system of constitutional monarchy, the Governor-General holds executive power in name but exercises it upon the advice of the elected government. In reality, the Governor-General has no substantive executive power. Should we appoint a head of state with substantive executive power, power currently exercised by the Prime Minister or ministers of the Crown answerable to parliament? Such a system would separate the legislature and the executive; that is, it would increase the checks and balances and the exercise of power in our system.

For my own part, I believe the checks and balances in our system are already extensive. They are certainly more than those that apply to the Westminster system of government in Britain. The Senate has unlimited powers to reject legislation including the power to bring down a popularly elected government, our constitution is a federal constitution with states exercising powers and Australia has an entrenched judiciary not at all unwilling to strike down government legislation.

There is another alternative: a president directly elected but with no substantive executive power, along the lines of the Irish model. Whilst I think this works quite well in Ireland, Australia is different. In Ireland it has the capacity to produce a president with a basis for emotional support but without a conflict of powers in relation to the elected government. It does not produce a non-politician. In my view, any person who wins a contested election is a politician.

The difference in Australia is a powerful Upper House with the power to reject money bills. This means the role of the Governor-General can never be ceremonial. If the Senate did not possess the powers to reject money bills and if it were impossible for the Senate and House to deadlock, an Irish model would be feasible. My assessment is that any section 128 referendum which sought to strip the Senate of its power to reject money bills to pave the way for an elected ceremonial president would almost certainly face defeat.

In the circumstances, those who genuinely wish to resolve the republican problem in their lifetime, Gareth, would not see this as a feasible alternative. This brings me to the proposal that a president be elected by a two-thirds majority of both houses of parliament. As far as I can gather, the argument in favour of this alternative is that the people, through their elected representatives, get a say in the head of state. This proposal comes with or without add-ons.

The latest add-on is that, whilst appointment would take a two-thirds majority of both houses, dismissal would take a simple majority of one. I leave aside the question of why you would want to entrench an appointment without entrenching the dismissal.

The two-thirds parliamentary majority has always left me cold. It is not a directly elected presidency deriving legitimacy from the votes of the electorate; nor is it directly akin to the current Westminster practice. In effect, a president appointed with a two-thirds majority of both houses would enjoy a greater mandate than the Prime Minister, who needs a majority of only the House of Representatives. It is an attempt at compromise which would overcome the problems with the institution of the monarchy but, in my opinion, sow the seed for further constitutional trouble. I doubt it would be the end of the matter. It might be the first republic, but I am not sure it would be the last.

I judge that the disquiet or uncomfortableness with the concept of a monarchy will continue to build. We should address this and not allow people to use it to build other agendas. I am chastened by the Canadian experience. A simple attempt to repatriate the Constitution and institute a charter of rights has led to what is now described as mega constitutional politics, raising questions of succession, distinct cultural rights, sovereignty to indigenous people and a whole lot of other issues which have been advanced in a climate of general flux and change.

But I am for change. I would like to see Australia deal with the issue of a republic - not because of what others think of us but because of what we think of ourselves. Those who are advocating radical constitutional change are, in my assessment, advocating certain section 128 defeat. The history of previous section 128 referenda should give us a realistic focus.

The public is very reluctant to change the Constitution, and its reluctance grows as the extent of the change grows. The unease at the centre of our constitutional arrangements is not because they do not work but because the symbols which underlie them are running out of believability - and this will gnaw at legitimacy. I am not for change at any price but I do believe that in changing we could secure and safeguard what is best, that by directing it we would get a better outcome than allowing pressure to build up and explode, and that history and convention makes such a change a feasible and workable constitutional improvement.

I wish you well in your deliberations.