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It
is a great pleasure to come to Adelaide to deliver
this lecture. I am delighted and honoured to
see His Excellency the Governor with Lady Neal.
You and I have been very good friends for many
years, and I recall particularly our association
with the Duke of Edinburgh's Commonwealth Conference
in 1986. It is a great pleasure to see you Mr
Hawke on an occasion which specifically honours
you, and with you your lady wife.
I was present last year when Mr Hawke delivered
the first annual lecture under the auspices
of the Bob Hawke Prime Ministerial Centre. That
Centre had been established in December 1997
in the University of South Australia, the State
in which Bob Hawke was born. His hand has not
lost its cunning; he said very early in his
lecture here in Adelaide that the most brilliant
decision of his career was his choice of two
South Australians as his parents. He misses
few opportunities.
The Centre will house an extensive library in
which the Prime Ministerial papers, records
and memorabilia of the Hawke years will be collected,
together with other related material, and will
be available for study and research. The Centre
will also serve as a 'classroom for democracy',
the public will have access to it, and programs
founded on civics and citizenship will be devised
and developed.
Dr Basil Hetzel, the foundation Chancellor of
the University of South Australia, informed
me of the project and invited me to become a
patron of the Centre. I readily accepted, and
I share the role with Sir Ninian Stephen, Sir
Eric Neal, the Governor of South Australia,
Dame Roma Mitchell, Dr Lowitja O'Donoghue and
Ms Jennie George. I am also honoured by the
invitation to give the Hawke Lecture, which
is to be an annual event and a centrepiece in
the calendar of the Centre, and I am specially
pleased to be the first lecturer to follow Mr
Hawke in this series. He spoke on the theme
of A Confident Australia.
In The End of Certainty, one of Paul
Kelly's important contributions to Australian
political history, he wrote that Bob Hawke brought
a great idea to the Party he inherited. This
was the notion of national consensus, and this
found expression in the argument of A Confident
Australia in stressing the importance of
fostering co-operation and consensus in achieving
benefits for Australia and Australians.
Mr Hawke spoke with pride of his achievement
in the course of his long term as Prime Minister.
He also expressed concern at the appearance
of divisive elements and acrimonious confrontation
which threatens and puts at risk the confidence
which has been built up through the vigorous
promotion of consensus on particular issues.
I have been linked with Mr Hawke in the quest
for consensus. I have never been involved in
party politics, but as Vice-Chancellor of the
University of Queensland during troubled and
tumultuous days in the early 1970's, I was described
retrospectively by a Senator of the University
as "the pre-Hawke consensus man", and speeches
and papers which I gave and wrote at that time
reflected, and were intended to affirm, my strong
belief that the sense of institutions being
legitimate - especially the institutions of
government - is the glue that holds societies
together. When it weakens, things became unstuck.
These were the words of Senator Daniel Moynihan,
then an American presidential adviser - to Richard
Nixon, as it happens, who was not - alas - listening.
I have taken as my theme for this lecture An
Australian Republic - A Guide for the Perplexed.
Some will recognise the words 'a guide for the
perplexed' as the title of a famous medieval
work of the great Jewish philosopher Maimonides,
though we are here concerned with different
perplexities.
For myself, I am concerned with the issues of
an Australian republic which have assumed prominence
in recent years, and particularly since Mr Keating
succeeded Mr Hawke in the Prime Ministership
and leadership of the Labor Party very early
in this decade. The issues I shall discuss are
those involved in the forthcoming referendum,
and I shall not discuss other issues, for instance
the position of the States.
The issue of an Australian republic has been
in the public domain for a long time. Radical
nationalists in the latter part of the nineteenth
century called for Australian national independence
as a republic, and saw the monarchy as a symbol
of British dominance and Australian subordination.
At this time, the republican voice was small
and ineffective, and it had no practical significance
in the process of Australian constitution making,
in and out of the constitutional conventions
in the last decade of the nineteenth century.
In the course of the twentieth century, particular
events brought the issue forward.
In the wake of the constitutional upheaval of
November 1975, when Sir John Kerr dismissed
the Whitlam government, there was some talk
of a republic. While the events did not involve
the Queen directly - Sir John Kerr was at pains
to point out that this was so, and Buckingham
Palace made the same point - the fact that the
Governor-General was appointed by the Queen
and lacked any electoral base, but was representative
of the Queen, and acted as he did, was seen
by some as a constitutional deficiency, and
as a good ground for remaking the constitution
without monarchical institutions.
Such growth in republican sentiment as there
was, however, was plainly insufficient to effect
change.
So too, the advent of the Australian bicentenary
in 1988 provided an occasion for discussion
and debate on a range of constitutional issues,
and in 1985 Mr Hawke, as Prime Minister, announced
the establishment of a Constitutional Commission
to undertake a comprehensive review of the Constitution
and of constitutional issues. The Commission,
which comprised six individuals, was to be assisted
in its tasks by a number of Constitutional Committees,
and I was appointed Chairman of the Committee
on Executive Powers. I was then living in Oxford,
but I came to Australia on a number of occasions
to take part in the work of the Committee.
In the context of Executive Power, the Committee
explored the matter of a republican form of
government in some detail and there were some
well known republicans in the committee. Nevertheless,
despite their sympathy for the idea, the Committee
resolved to make no recommendation for a republic
to the Commission on the ground that there was
no reasonable prospect of such a proposal being
carried at a referendum, and that, this being
the case, to present it with such a proposal
for constitutional change might serve to prejudice
the prospects of other constitutional proposals.
So it was that in its substantial report in
1988, the Constitutional Commission made no
recommendation; it adopted the advice of its
committee.
A few years before this time, Mr Hawke made
a brief, but significant, statement on the issue
of an Australian republic in his Boyer Lectures
for 1979 which were entitled The Resolution
of Conflict. He said that he did not
believe that Australia would necessarily be
better off as a republic, but that for reasons
of national identity he would prefer to break
the link with the British Crown and "have our
own President as Head of State, possessing formal
and ceremonial powers only".
In his memoirs published in 1994, there is no
reference to or discussion of the republic.
Mark McKenna in his book The Captive Republic
says that as Prime Minister, Mr Hawke's energies
were devoted to the portrayal of Labor as a
non radical government in the consensus model.
"During his eight years as Prime Minister, he
avoided any open declaration of immediate support
for a republic." Whether 'avoided' is le
mot juste, he didn't address it.
On the other hand, in 1983 he went into the
election on a party platform which included
the goal of an Australian republic. He also
spoke about constitutional reform, and attended
the Constitutional Convention in Sydney in 1991,
which was convened to commemorate the holding
of the National Australasian convention of 1891,
and this was the first Constitutional Convention
in Australia - the 1991 Convention - to conclude
with majority support for an Australian republic.
This gave support to Sir Ninian Stephen's observation
in that year that the issue of Australia becoming
a republic was "engaging the attention of the
Australian people more than at any time in the
past."
In late 1991, Mr Hawke resigned as Prime Minister,
and was succeeded by Paul Keating. As he, Bob
Hawke, said in his address on A Confident
Australia last year, Paul Keating revealed
himself to be an ardent supporter of the republican
cause, and this advocacy climaxed in the historic
speech in the
House of Representatives in June 1995 on the
establishment of an Australian republic.
His case was put squarely on the significance
of an Australian Head of State:
"Each
and every Australian should be able to aspire
to be our Head of State. Every Australian
should know that the office will always be
filled by a citizen of high standing who has
made an outstanding contribution to Australia,
and who in making it has enlarged our view
of what it is to be Australian."
In these and other ways, the creation of an
Australian republic can actually deliver a heightened
sense of unity, it can enliven our national
spirit and, in our own minds and those of our
neighbours, answer beyond doubt the perennial
question of Australian identity - the question
of what we are and what we stand for. The answer
is not what having a foreign Head of State suggests.
We are not a political or cultural appendage
to another country's past. We are simply and
unambiguously Australian.
It was in this way that he met an argument that
the exercise of changing to a republic was unnecessary.
That argument led to the claim that the evolution
of our constitution had yielded the outcome
that we already had, in substance, the reality
of a republic, with a little gilt on its sleeve
- spelled gilt.
The Queen - the one person, but with multiple
royal titles - the Queen of the United Kingdom,
Queen of Australia, of Canada etc - was Australia's
Head of State, and she was represented in Australia
by a Governor-General. The office of Governor-General
had evolved from one which was held normally
by a British eminence, and appointed by the
monarch on the advice of United Kingdom Ministers,
to one in which the Governor-General was an
Australian citizen appointed on the advice of
Australian Ministers, specifically the Prime
Minister.
This process of change, in terms of the source
of appointment, began with the appointment of
Isaac Isaacs whose biographer I had been. That
the appointee would always be an Australian
was not firmly established until the appointment
of Lord Casey in 1965.
The Keating model envisaged a Constitutional
President and not an executive president in
the American pattern, an Australian Constitutional
Head of State operating within a framework in
which minimal change to the existing constitutional
framework was necessary or required. Such an
Australian Head of State would make sense to
our Asian neighbours in the world who found
the situation of the Queen not readily explicable.
Of course, it would be possible to go further
and propose more radical change, say by replacing
the existing structure with an executive presidency
operating within a full blown separation of
powers as in the United States. I do not see
this as desired or desirable. It is not our
way, certainly at this stage.
The Keating proposals were not carried forward
at this time because the Labor government fell
at the election of 1996, and Mr Keating largely
withdrew from the Australian political scene.
What had been proposed for the Head of State
was that he or she should be an Australian citizen,
that he or she should be elected by a joint
sitting of the two Houses of Parliament on a
motion by the Prime Minister that a named citizen
should be chosen.
When the Labor government fell at the election
of 1996, Mr John Howard succeeded as Prime Minister.
He had announced himself as a supporter of the
maintenance of the monarchy in Australia, and
as a supporter of existing arrangements.
In this respect, his government is divided.
Some are declared monarchists, some are declared
republicans. Mr Howard, however, committed the
government to the holding of a convention
to ascertain the views of the Australian people
on the issue.
This body, partly elected, partly nominated,
met in Canberra in February 1998, and I attended
the opening session. For the rest, it must be
said that the convention attracted wide public
interest. One who had observed it wrote "The
ten days of debate and deliberation in Old Parliament
House during February involved the people of
Australia."
One very real reason for this captivation may
have been that ordinary people (and not merely
extraordinary politicians) were themselves involved
in the convention. The Convention concluded
amidst considerable euphoria that was part its
own and part that of the community at large.
There was a proposal for a republic, and it
was promised to be put to referendum. The mode
of selection of the President took a great deal
of the time of the Convention.
In line with the Convention's
recommendations, the draft legislation for
this year's referendum proposes that the following
words, amongst others, be written into the Constitution:
After considering the report of a committee
established as the Parliament provides to
invite and consider nominations for appointment
as President, the Prime Minister may, in a
joint sitting of the members of the Senate
and the House of Representatives, move that
a named Australian citizen be chosen as the
President.
If the Prime Minister's motion is seconded
by the leader of the Opposition (if any) in
the House of Representatives, and affirmed
by a two-thirds majority of the total number
of the members of the Senate and the House
of Representatives, the named Australian citizen
is chosen as the President.
I think that this proposal is good, and for
reasons I shall elaborate later, I strongly
support it.
I have followed the republic debate over many
years with close interest, as a lawyer and,
of course, because I had held the Office of
Governor-General from 1977-1982, and I have
written on aspects of it over the years. In
1988, the Bicentenary of European settlement
in Australia was commemorated. On this occasion,
I was invited to give the annual Churchill Lecture
in the Guildhall in London. It was a great honour,
and it was both appropriate and expected that
I should speak to an Australian theme.
Taking Browning's title, I spoke on "Home Thoughts
from Abroad"; abroad, at this time, was England
from which I looked to home which was Australia.
I looked at the evolution of institutions: within
the existing monarchical structure, the Governor-General
of Australia was an Australian appointed by
the monarch on the advice of the Australian
Prime Minister, and he discharged functions
and powers which covered virtually the whole
field to the exclusion of the monarch herself.
With such arrangements in place, the historian
Geoffrey Blainey said that Australia was in
practice a republic: effectively the powers
of the Queen were exercised by her Australian
representative. At the end, it seemed to me
that the republican cause, while it commanded
support, was by no means strong enough to lead
to a successful constitutional amendment; any
such proposal would fall very far short of achieving
that.
There were other factors which might support
a case for an Australian republic: the change
in the mix of the Australian people through
a far reaching migration program, and the fact
that the monarch was of necessity largely an
absentee.
So my conclusion was that my own experience
as Governor-General which took me to many places
within Australia, does not suggest to me that
a change to a republic is necessary or seen
as necessary to an adequate expression of our
distinct national identity, though I know that
others do not agree. For at least some of them,
the issue is not seen as highly placed on the
agenda of constitutional change: political leaders,
like the Prime Minister (Mr Hawke) who list
it on the agenda, appear content to leave it
on the back burner. For a substantial majority
of Australians, it is not on the agenda of change
at all.
Then from the early 1990's, I published (and
delivered in speech) a series of papers traversing
the issues in an Australian republic. During
this decade there has been a significant shift
in national sentiment.
In September 1997, I gave an address at Georgetown,
Washington D.C, in the course of which I said
that on further reflection I had come to the
conclusion that the symbolic change to a republic
should be made, and that it was a matter of
importance for an independent Australia to state
simply and unambiguously our national status
in constitutional terms. We would retain our
parliamentary system unimpaired. We would have
a Head of State who was an Australian citizen
and resident who is exclusively ours, and who
fully and unequivocally symbolises our nation.
In considering the best form of an Australian
republic, we should give careful attention to
a very simple question, but one which is crucial,
and which has so far been largely overlooked
- what will the President do? As the powers
proposed for the President are to be 'the same
as those exercised by the Governor-General,'
perhaps some account of my experience of the
Office of Governor-General will provide some
guidance.
Some years ago, I read a newspaper paragraph
relating to my successor as Governor-General,
in which he was described as 'our democracy's
latest rubber stamp'. This is not dissimilar
to the view of the late 'Diamond Jim' McClelland
that Governor-Generals were acceptable as long
as they confined themselves to the opening of
fetes and the ceremonial cutting of ribbons.
These opinions plainly express a general picture
of the office.
Let me say that I believe such a view to be
wrong. There is no wisdom in caricaturing the
Office, and no useful purpose is served by characterising
it - or the Office of President in an Australian
republic - as a purely formal ceremonial office.
The evidence against it is overwhelming: the
fact is that performance of the duties of the
Office require, and will continue to require,
long hard work and careful preparation of complex
subject matter for meetings and activities and
functions, involving many and diverse groups
and people.
Through his or her activities the President
can offer encouragement and give recognition
to many Australians, some of whom are not very
powerful or visible in the course and bustle
of everyday life, and to the efforts of individuals
and groups who work constructively to improve
life in Australia.
In my term of office we - I include my wife,
as the role of spouse should never be forgotten
or under-estimated - visited and took part in
meetings of an extraordinarily wide range of
community groups, and our participation was
seen as support and recognition of their work
and activities. I believe that this gave them
assurance and encouragement, and that is surely
good.
The diversity of these groups was also reflected
in our Government House guest lists. I believe
too that the President can promote unity where
practitioners of politics are partisan, and
at times quite sharply divided, or, if this
is too grand a claim, can at least help to preserve
and keep in repair the consensus in our society.
This should always call for careful judgement
on the part of the President in action and speech.
It does not, however, prescribe a diet of colourless
and insubstantial speech and activity.
I think that it is wrong to underestimate the
qualities which will be required of a President.
Both Sir Ninian Stephen, as the incoming Governor-General,
and I were generously described as "too well
qualified" for the Office of Governor-General.
The suggestion was that other offices such as
those of a High Court Judge, and maybe a Vice-Chancellor
or scholar-professor or scientist or businessman,
made greater intellectual demands.
I have to say that this is a view which certainly
did not match my own experience of the needs
of the Office. I was intellectually stretched
and tested over my years in that role, and I
often found that in the range of speeches, meetings
and activities, I was stretched to the limits
of my understanding, that all my knowledge,
experience and capacity were called upon in
responding to what was asked and expected of
me.
Of course, I could have done the work differently,
and at a different level, but for what conceivable
reason should it be done other than at the very
highest standard of which the incumbent Governor-General,
or President, is capable? When one has regard
to the range of activities in the Australian
community with which the President may be involved,
the facts demonstrate that he or she cannot
be too well qualified. The person holding that
Office has to possess a variety of capacities
to be sure, including capacities to relate to
people and to communicate at many levels.
Some of the relationships established may not
be as intellectually complex as others, but
they are all important. It may be that a judgement
can be made that the taking of a distinguished
High Court Judge from the Bench of that very
important court creates difficulties for the
manning of the Bench; it is quite another thing,
in my opinion, to say that such a person should
not be appointed either as Governor-General
or as President because he or she is over-qualified,
over-skilled. At the present time, I think it
is very important to make this point.
And let me make it clear that I am not speaking
specifically or even primarily about the role
of the President in constitutional matters.
I draw on an experience which tells me plainly
that the most significant role that the President
will perform will be in the course of daily
relationships with many diverse groups of Australians,
talking with them, and, hopefully, not at them.
The response is often quite remarkable and very
moving; it reinforces my view that this is how
the Presidency will make itself most effective.
Of course, the Governor-General or President
also has important constitutional roles: at
intervals relating to appointment of Ministers
and dissolution of Parliament, the more regular
business of the Executive Council, and fulfilling
the famous Bagehot 'rights' - 'to be consulted,
to encourage, to warn'.
These constitutional powers will invariably
be exercised subject to the continuing conventions
of our Constitution, and almost invariably on
ministerial advice. But, as I believe, the more
important role of the President, as of the Governor-General,
is that of representing the nation to itself.
That may sound high-flown, but it says what
I deeply believe.
The question that must then be asked is whether
someone capable of fulfilling the very considerable
demands which will be made on a President is
more likely to be found by election by at least
two-thirds of the Parliament, or by direct popular
election? I myself have no doubt of the answer.
What would be the likely outcomes of these alternative
systems of election? Let us first take parliamentary
election on the terms proposed for this year's
referendum. For a person to be chosen by the
Prime Minister from the names that come forward
in the proposed public nomination process, and
for the Prime Minister's nomination to be seconded
by the Opposition Leader, and for that bi-partisan
nomination to be approved by two-thirds of a
joint sitting of the two Houses of Parliament,
ensures that the person who becomes President
will have to be acceptable widely across the
political spectrum.
It seems to me as certain as we could make it
that such a system will result in the election
as President of a non-partisan person of distinction
who is endorsed by all major parties as a suitable
person to be President of Australia. The draft
legislation for this year's referendum specifically
says that the person must not be a member of
a Parliament, nor a member of a political party.
Even without that provision, it seems to me
that election by two-thirds of a joint sitting
is safeguard enough.
What would be the case with direct popular election?
Presumably we would have competing candidates
campaigning around the country to be elected
as President. The most likely scenario is that
political parties would endorse candidates for
election. There would very likely be a Liberal
or Coalition candidate, a Labor candidate, a
Democrat, and so on. Where would the candidates
secure the resources to run their nation-wide
campaigns - to organise their speaking tours
and their media conferences, to fund their media
campaigns, and to distribute campaign leaflets
and how-to-vote cards?
The most likely answer appears to be from political
parties. What surer way could there be of guaranteeing
that a politician - a partisan figure - will
be elected as President? Yet the election of
a partisan Head of State is the antithesis of
our system of constitutional parliamentary democracy
which requires a non-partisan Head of State.
On what issues would the competing candidates
campaign?
What would be the issues on which they would
debate to gain advantage, one over the other?
Presumably they would, like ordinary politicians,
appeal to various sections of the community
by advancing policies to favour this group or
that, to emphasise this priority or that? Again,
this seems to me the antithesis of our sort
of parliamentary democracy in which the Head
of State stands for all the people, and the
policy issues are debated and decided in Parliament
and in elections for Members of Parliament.
Under direct election, it is highly likely that
we will end up with a President elected with,
say, 51% of the vote, after distribution of
preferences, to a runner-up's 49%. This does
not look like representation of all the people.
The system of parliamentary election is much
more likely to produce a President acceptable
across the whole community, the full breadth
of the political spectrum, rather than a person
supported by just over half and opposed - opposed
- by just under half the people.
What sort of person would stand for election
as President under such a system?
It seems that it would be someone who was willing
to be subject to a national political campaign
of self-promotion, and - it may be - denigration
of others or by others. I very much doubt whether
the non-partisan figures who have held the office
of Governor-General would have been willing
to take part in, or be subject to, such a campaign.
This is partly because those who may best serve
us as President are not by nature campaigning
politicians. They are likely to hold positions
from which it is not appropriate or proper to
campaign in such a way.
For myself, I can safely say that, although
I would have been willing to allow my name to
go forward with bi-partisan support to a joint
sitting of Parliament, I would not have agreed
to take part in a nation-wide election campaign,
struggling for media interest and the support
of this party or that pressure group.
There is another point. If the President of
Australia is directly elected by the people,
he or she will be the only holder of public
office who is so elected, the only person with
that direct democratic legitimacy. The Prime
Minister, after all, is indirectly chosen by
the people, as the person best able to command
the confidence of the House of Representatives,
which the people elect. It may well be that,
especially in a crisis, a directly-elected President
will read the powers of his or her office expansively.
If the people have chosen the President, then
he or she - emboldened by an election victory
after a stirring campaign - may feel entitled
to assert the powers of the Head of State. We
may find that over time, gradually in day-to-day
governance and perhaps dramatically in a crisis,
we have created a presidency which challenges
the Prime Minister and the Parliament. Who knows
what form of executive or semi-executive presidential
system we could end with?
Certainly, it is clear to me that the stable
continuation of our present parliamentary system
would be prejudiced by the direct election of
the President. As someone who - to repeat -
wishes to see the continuation of our parliamentary
system but with a genuinely Australian head
of state, that seems to me most undesirable.
I therefore support the Constitutional Convention's
proposal that the President be elected by two-thirds
of a joint sitting of the two Houses of federal
Parliament. This is the proposal which will
be put to the people in November this year,
and I believe it can be safely recommended to
our fellow citizens as giving us an Australian
head of state without radical change to our
parliamentary system.
Of course there are other aspects which merit
attention. There is one I would like to mention
in closing. It is the question of whether Australia's
becoming a republic has any implications for
Australia's continued membership of the Commonwealth.
Bob Hawke's active participation in Commonwealth
affairs as Prime Minister, including his very
successful involvement at Commonwealth Heads
of Government Meetings, is recounted in his
memoirs. I have myself maintained an interest
in the Commonwealth as an observer and writer,
and I share with many other Australians a desire
that our involvement in the Commonwealth should
not be diminished by a change in our constitutional
arrangements.
The point can be simply put: Australia's becoming
a republic is entirely consistent with our continuing
membership of the Commonwealth. This point was
established almost exactly fifty years ago,
when the consequence of a member state of the
Commonwealth becoming a republic was considered
by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers meeting
in London in 1949.
It was there resolved that India, which had
put the matter before the Prime Ministers, might
maintain membership of the Commonwealth as a
republic, and that India would for its part
recognize the monarch as Head of the Commonwealth.
The resolution was then specific to India and
to King George VI. Principle pointed to a more
general application, and so it was that a general
rule was adopted. The upshot is that the modern
Commonwealth includes states which are republics
- the majority - those which have their separate
monarchs, and a substantial minority which retain
the monarch, among these Australia.
To one like me, who had accepted as mother's
milk the doctrine that membership of the Commonwealth
required allegiance to the Crown, and that the
bond was one of common allegiance, the new doctrine,
though practically beneficial, came in 1949
as a surprise.
To Sir Robert Menzies, still in opposition on
the verge of his long career as Prime Minister,
there were great historic difficulties in accepting
it. I remember that soon after the decision
of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers was made
public, I - then a young Oxford law teacher
- was sitting alongside Mr Attlee, who was then
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and a
party to the London agreement. A youthful purist
(some might say pedant), I asked whether in
view of all of the history, he had difficulty
in reaching his conclusion. The most laconic
of men, he answered directly to the point. 'No.'
That was all.
We have come a long way in the fifty years since
then. Australia has come a long way since Bob
Hawke's Boyer lecture of just 20 years ago.
The idea of a republic has moved sharply up
our nation's agenda, and now commends itself
to many more Australians than was the case two
decades, even ten years, ago.
Thank you again for honouring me with your kind
invitation to deliver this second annual Bob
Hawke lecture. I wish him, and the Centre which
bears his name, well.
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