Malcolm Turnbull is the Chairman of the Australian Republican Movement

In February , the Constitutional Convention recommended that the "Bipartisan Appointment of the President Model' be put to the people in a referendum to be held next year. That model provided for:

• a President with the same powers as the Governor-General

• appointed by a two thirds majority of a joint sitting of both Houses of Parliament, on the motion of the Prime Minister and seconded by the Leader of the Opposition, and

• able to be removed by the Prime Minister, but with the proviso that the Prime Minister's action must be presented to a meeting of the House of Representatives for ratification within 30 days. If the House does not ratify the Prime Minister's action, it would be a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister who would then, consistent with convention, be obliged to resign.

Since the Constitutional Convention, a number of commentators have criticised the dismissal mechanism in the model as giving the Prime Minister too much power vis a vis the President.

The ARM went to the Convention with a model which required a bi-partisan majority to dismiss the President. We agreed to amend that because we took on board the point made by Richard McGarvie and others that if the President were failing to act impartially and, for example, conspiring with the Opposition to bring down a Government, there would be no prospect of securing bi-partisan support for his or her removal.

As my ARM colleague Linda Kirk said at the Convention; "The ARM's model for removal of a president promotes prime ministerial government and the supremacy of parliament. Furthemore, it satisfies the McGarvie principle of providing for prompt and effective removal of a President who acts without or contrary to advice. But unlike the McGarvie model, which makes the Constitutional Council a mere puppet of the Prime Minister, the ARM's model puts the onus on the Prime Minister to account to the Australian people through their representatives."

At the moment, of course, the Prime Minister can appoint and dismiss a Governor-General at his whim. The Queen, who makes the formal appointment and removal, is obliged to act on the Prime Minister's advice. She is entitled to express her opinion to the Prime Minister on the wisdom of the Prime Minister's course of action, but in the final analysis she is but a rubber stamp on the Prime Minister's decision.

The Convention model, in fact, presents a very considerably improved mechanism.

First, it preserves the principle that if the Prime Minister cannot work with the President, the Prime Minister can remove him.

Second, it imposes a formal discipline on the Prime Minister in obliging him to present his action to the House of Representatives for ratification. A Prime Minister would be most unlikely to consider sacking a President unless he was absolutely certain he had the support of his party room and wide support in the community.

Third, and this is the most important, a Prime Minister in an Australian republic will not be able to appoint the successor to the President he has just removed. In other words, a Prime Minister may be able to dispose of someone he feels he cannot work with, but he is not, going to be able to put a stooge in his place.

A new President will need to be appointed by the Joint Sitting with support of Government and Opposition. Pending that appointment, the vacancy will be filled by the senior State Governor at the time.

There are only two types of reasons a Prime Minister would want to sack a President; a good reason and a bad reason. The good reason is that the President is not doing his job properly. Perhaps he is a drunk, perhaps he has gone mad, perhaps he is playing politics with the Opposition and compromising his impartiality. The Prime Minister can remove him and in his place there will be in the first instance the senior State Governor and, once the Joint Sitting has been convened, another bi-partisan appointee.

The bad reason would be that the Prime Minister wants the President to do something wrong or stop him from doing something right. Perhaps he wants the President to sign a bill into law which has not been properly passed by Parliament. Perhaps the Prime Minister is consistently breaking the law and fears being sacked by the President. Certainly such an unscrupulous Prime Minister can sack a a scrupulous President, but, he cannot put some one compliant in his place. Indeed one can well imagine that the new President, be it the senior State Governor pro tem, or the new bi-partisan appointee will be even more alert to Prime Ministerial misconduct.

A Prime Minister contemplating dismissing a President will no doubt consider the wisdom of the old rhyme: "Always keep a-hold of nurse, for fear of finding something worse!"

What other mechanisms could be used to dismiss a President?

One approach, which the ARM canvassed early in the Convention, was for dismissal to be effected by a simple majority vote of the House of Representatives. It was felt by many, however, that too much mischief could be done in the lead up to that debate that it was better, and more seemly, for the dismissal to take place immediately, with the Prime Minister being left to defend his actions after the event.

Another refinement would be to require the Prime Minister to seek some counsel before he acted. In reality a Prime Minister would do precisely that, of course. Does anyone imagine a Prime Minister would sack a President without canvassing the views of his Cabinet and at least the more significant members of his party room? If it were felt this should be formalised (and I do not think there is any need to do so), then it could be provided that the notice to dismiss the President should be countersigned by a majority of the members of the Executive Council.

Finally, it is important to remember two things: first, no Governor-General has ever been dismissed and that in circumstances when a Prime Minister can appoint the replacement. How likely is it that a Prime Minister would take the chance of sacking a President and winding up with someone even less to his liking? Second, the Bipartisan Appointment Model was the result of the largest, and most representative body of Australians ever gathered together to consider the Australian Constitution. It represented a compromise and in that sense was nobody's "ideal model". Those who seek perfection, without regard to the reality of democratic politics, may well end up achieving nothing.